Larry Laudan
1965
a) “[Adolf] Grünbaum on ‘the Duhemian Argument’,” Philosophy of Science, 32: 296-300.
1966
a) “The Clock Metaphor and Probabilism: The Impact of Descartes on British Methodological Thought, 1650-65,” Annals of Science, 22: 73-104.
b) “Method and the Mechanical Philosophy,” History of Science, 5: 117-24.
c) The Idea of Physical Theory from Galileo to Newton. (My Ph.D. thesis. 345 pages}
1967
a) “The Nature and Sources of Locke’s Views on Hypotheses,” Journal of the History of Ideas, 23: 211-23.
b). (editor with G. Buchdahl), William Whewell’s History of the Inductive Sciences. 3 vols., 1,140pp. Publisher: Frank Cass & Co.
1968
a) “Theories of Scientific Method from Plato to Mach,” History of Science, 7: 1-63.
b) “Introduction” to Colin Maclaurin’s Account of Sir Isaac Newton’s Philosophical Discoveries (Cass, London), ix-xxv.
c) “A Postmortem on the Vis Viva Controversy,” Isis, 59: 130-43.
d) “Introduction” to The Collected Works of William Whewell, 5 vols., Cass, London, 1968-77.
1969
a) “Introduction” to Samuel Clark’s translation of Jacques Rouault’s System of Natural Philosophy, (Johnson, New York), vol. 1, ix-xxiv.
1970
a) “Commentary,” in R. Stuewer, Ed., Minnesota Studies in Philosophy of Science (University of Minnesota Press, Minneapolis), 127-32; 230-38.
b) “Thomas Reid and the Newtonian Turn of British Methodological Thought,” in Butts and Davis, Eds., The Methodological Heritage of Newton (University of Toronto Press, Toronto), 103-31.
1971
a) “William Whewell and the Consilience of Inductions,” The Monist, Spring, 368-91. (SH)
b) “Reply to Mary Hesse,” The Monist, Spring, 525.
c) “Towards a Re-assessment of Comte’s `Méthode Positive’,” Philosophy of Science, 38: 35-53. (SH)
d) Reprint of 1966b in Bobbs-Merrill Series in History of Science.
1973
a) “Charles Sanders Peirce and the Trivialization of the Self-Correction Thesis,” in R. Giere and R. Westfall, Foundations of Scientific Method in the 19th Century (Indiana University Press, Bloomington), pp.226-251.
1974
a) “Induction and Probability in the 19th Century,” Proceedings: IV International Congress for Logic, Methodology and Philosophy of Science (North Holland, Amsterdam).
b) “G. L. LeSage: A Case Study in the Interaction of Physics and Philosophy,” in Akten des II. Leibniz-Kongresses (Weisbaden), 241-52.
c) Reprint of 1965 in S. Harding, ed., Can Theories Be Refuted? Dordrecht: Reidel.
1976
a) “The Methodological Foundations of Mach’s Opposition to Atomism,” in R. Turnbull and P. Machamer, Eds., Motion and Time: Space and Matter (Ohio State University Press, Columbus), 390-417.
b) “I Modelli Nella Storia della Scienza,” in Enciclopedia della Scienza e della Technica (Mondadori, Milan), 467-72.
c) “Two Dogmas of Methodology,” Philosophy of Science, 43: 467-72.
1977
a) “The Sources of Modern Methodology,” in J. Hintikka and R. Butts, Eds., Historical and Philosophical Dimensions of Logic, Methodology and Philosophy of Science (Reidel, Dordrecht), 3-20.
b) Progress and Its Problems, University of California Press, Berkeley, Routledge & Kegan Paul, London; 280 pp. (Paperback issued, Berkeley.)
c) Reprint with new appendix of 1967 in I. Tipton, Locke on Human Understanding (Oxford U. Press: Oxford), 149-62.
d) Il Progresso Scientifico: Prospettive per Una Teoria. (Rome: Armando Editore), 278pp.
e) La Dynamique de la Science, French, (University of California Press), 255 pages.
1978
a) “Ex-Huming Hacking,” Erkenntnis, 13: 417-35. (SH).
1979
a) “Historical Methodologies,” in H. Kyburg & P. Asquith, Eds., Current Research in Philosophy of Science (Philosophy of Science Association, East Lansing), 40-54.
b) “Why Was the Logic of Discovery Abandoned?” in T. Nickles, Ed., Scientific Discovery, Logic, and Rationality (Reidel, Dordrecht), 173-84.
1980
a) “Views of Progress: Separating the Pilgrims from the Rakes,” Philosophy of the Social Sciences, 10: 273-86.
b) “Teorías do Método Científico de Platao a Mach,” Cadernos de Historia e Filosofía da Ciencia, Beiheft No. 1, Cadernos Series, 89 pp.
1981
a) “The Medium and Its Message: A Study of Some Philosophical Controversies about Ether,” in G. Cantor and M. Hodge, Eds., Conceptions of Ether (C.U.P., Cambridge), 157-86.
b) “A Problem-Solving Approach to Scientific Progress,” in I. Hacking, Ed., Scientific Revolutions, (Oxford Readings in Philosophy Series, O.U.P., Oxford), 144-55.
c) “A Confutation of Convergent Realism,” Philosophy of Science, 48: 19-49.
d) “The Unfinished Einsteinean Revolution in Philosophy,” in P. Barker and C. Shugart, Eds., After Einstein (Memphis State University Press, Memphis), 133-46.
e) “Epilog,” in Ibid., 237-40.
f) “Anomalous Anomalies,” Philosophy of Science, 48: 618-619.
g) Science and Hypothesis: Historical Essays on Scientific Methodology, Dordrecht: D. Reidel. 258 pp., (Issued in hardcover and paperback.)
1982
a) “A Reply to My Critics,” in I. Hacking and P. Asquith, Eds., PSA-78. Philosophy of Science Association, East Lansing. pp.530-50.
b) “More on Bloor,” Philosophy of the Social Sciences, 12: 71-74.
c) Italian translation of Science and Hypothesis. Armando, Rome.
d) “Collins’ Blend of Relativism and Empiricism,” Social Studies of Science, 12: 131-33.
e) “Separating Sheep and Goats,” Science, Technology and Human Values, Winter, pp. 000-000.
f) “Two Puzzles about Science,” Minerva, 20: 253-268.
g) “Science at the Bar: Causes for Concern,” Science, Technology and Human Values, 7: 16-19.
h) “Problems, Truth and Consistency,” Studies in History and Philosophy of Science, 13: 73-80.
1983
a) “The Demise of the Demarcation Problem,” in R. Cohen and L. Laudan, Eds., Physics, Philosophy and Psychoanalysis (Reidel, Dordrecht), pp. 111-128. (Reprinted in R. Laudan, ed., Virginia Tech Working Papers in STS (Blacksburg).)
b) “Invention and Justification,” Philosophy of Science, 50: 320-22.
c) “Confusions about Discovery,” in PSA-82 (Philosophy of Science Association, forthcoming), c.27 pp.
d) Italian translation of 1980b, Armando, Rome.
e) Italian translation of 1981b in a volume published by Guis. Laterza & Figli, Rome.
f) Reprint of 1982g in J. Murphy, Ed., Evolution, Morality, and the Meaning of Life. Rowman & Littlefield, Tatawa, N.J. pp. 149-154,
g) Reprint of 1982g in M. La Follette, ed. Creationism, Science, and the Law. Cambridge: M.I.T. Press. pp. 161-166.
h) Editor, Mind and Medicine: Problems of Explanation and Evaluation in Psychiatry and the Biomedical Sciences. Berkeley: University of California Press, 365 pp.
i) Editor (with R. S. Cohen), Physics, Philosophy and Psychoanalysis. Reidel, Dordrecht, 338 pp.
“More on Creationism,” in Science, Technology and Human Values, 8: 36-38.
j) Mind and Medicine: Problems of Explanation and Evaluation in Psychiatry and the Biomedical Sciences (Pittsburgh Series in Philosophy and History of Science) | Nov 15, 1983.
1984
a) “Realism without the Real,” Philosophy of Science, 51:156-62.
b) Science and Values. Berkeley: University of California Press: 149 pp. (Issued in hardcover and paperback.)
c) “Explaining the Success of Science: Beyond Epistemic Realism and Relativism,” G. Gutting et al., eds., Science and Reality: Recent Work in the Philosophy of Science. Notre Dame Press, Notre Dame. 83-105.
d) Reprint of 1981c in J. Leplin, Ed., Scientific Realism. Berkeley: University of California Press.
e) “Reconstructing Methodology,” in P. Anderson & M. Ryan, eds., Scientific Method in Marketing: Philosophy, Sociology and History of Science Perspectives. Chicago: American Marketing Association.
f) Spanish translation of 1981b in a volume published by Cuerva, Madrid.
g) Reprint of 1981d in J. Brown, Ed., Scientific Rationality: The Sociological Turn. University of Toronto Press.
h) Chinese translation of 1981b in Journal for the Philosophical Problems of Natural Sciences, No. 1, pp. 74-80.
i) Chinese translation of 1980a in Journal for the Philosophical Problems of Natural Science, No. 3, pp. 58-62.
j) Chinese (abridged) translation of chapter two of 1982c in Journal for the Philosophical Problems of Natural Sciences, no. 2, pp. 62-69.
k) “The Pseudo-Science of Science?” Philosophy of the Social Sciences, 11: 173-98.
l) (with Rachel Laudan). The Nature of Technological Knowledge. Kluwer.
m) “A Confutation of Convergent Realism,” in Jarrett Leplin, ed., Scientific Realism (University of California Press), pp. 218-249.
1985
a) “Kuhn’s Critique of Methodology,” in J. Pitt, ed., Change and Progress in Modern Science. Reidel, Dordrecht. pp. 283-300.
b) Japanese translation of Progress and Its Problems, with new postscript. Schisuza, Tokyo.
1986
a) “Some Problems facing Intuitionistic Meta-Methodologies,” Synthese, 67: 115-129.
b) (and others). “Testing Theories of Scientific Change,” Synthese, 69: 141-223.
c) “Dissecting the Holist Picture of Scientific Change,” in J. Kourany, Scientific Knowledge (Wadsworth, Belmont, Ca.), pp. 276-95.
d) Spanish translation of Progress and Its Problems, with new postscript. Ediciones Encuentro, Madrid.
e) “Perché regna l’accordo nelle scienze (naturali)?” Nuova Civilta delle Macchine, 4: 58-64.
f) (with Rachel Laudan and others), “Scientific Change: Philosophical Models and Historical Research,” Synthese, vol. 69, pp. 141-224.
g) Science and Values: The Aims of Science/ Pittsburgh Series n Philosophy and History of Science(. .
1987
a) “Progress or Rationality? The Prospects for Normative Naturalism,” American Philosophical Quarterly, 24: 19-33.
b) “Relativism, Naturalism and Reticulation,” Synthese, 71: 25pp.
c) La Scienza e i Valori (an Italian translation of Science and Values). Laterza, Rome. 89pp.
d) La Dynamique de la Sciencia (Pierre Mardaga: Liège). 264pp. (A translation, with a new foreword of Progress and Its Problems.)
e) “Methodology: Its Prospects,” PSA-86, vol. 2 (P. Machamer, ed., East Lansing, Mich.). 25pp.
1988
a) (with R. Laudan & A. Donovan), eds., Scrutinizing Science: Empirical Studies of Scientific Change. Kluwer Academic Publishers,. 379pp.
b) “Introduction” to 1988a, pp. 3-44.
c) Reprint of 1982g in J. Feinberg, T. Beauchamp, eds., Philosophy and the Human Condition. 2nd ed.
d) German translation of 1980a in L. Schäfer, Die Wiederentdeckung des Entdeckens. Suhrkamp: Frankfurt/M.
e) “Are All Theories Equally Good? A Dialogue,” in R. Nola, ed., Relativism and Realism in Science. Dordrecht: Kluwer. pp. 117-39.
f) Reprint of 1982g in M. Ruse, ed., But Is It Science? The Philosophical Question in he Creation/Evolution Controversy. Buffalo: Prometheus Books. pp.351-56.
g) “Cognitive Relativism,” in R. Egidi, ed., La Svolta Relativistica nell’Epistemologia Contemporanea. (Rome: Franco Angeli), 203-224.
h) “Conceptual Problems Re-Visited,” Studies in History and Philosophy of Science, 19: 531-34. 8pp.
i) Reprint of 1983a in M. Ruse, ed., But Is It Science? The Philosophical Question in he Creation/Evolution Controversy. Buffalo: Prometheus Books. pp.337-350.
j) Reprint of 1983j in M. Ruse, ed., But Is It Science? The Philosophical Question in the Creation/Evolution Controversy. Buffalo: Prometheus Books. pp. 363-66.
k) “If It Ain’t Broke, Don’t Fix It,” British Journal for the Philosophy of Science, 40: 369-75.
l) “Perspectiva critica asupra axiologiei si metodologiei realiste,” in A. Botez, ed., Metamorfoze actuale in Filosofia Stiintei (Bucharest), 89-115. [Translation of a section from 1984b.]
1989
a). “Thoughts on HPS: 20 Years Later,” Studies in History and Philosophy of Science, pp. 9-13.
b). (with Rachel Laudan). “Dominance and the Disunity-of-Method: Solving the Problems of Innovation and Consensus,” Philosophy of Science, 56: 221-37.
c). “The Rational Weight of the Scientific Past: Forging Fundamental Change in a Conservative Discipline,” in Michael Ruse, ed., What the Philosophy of Biology Is: Essays dedicated to David Hull (Dordrecht: Kluwer). 209-20.
d). “For Method; Or, Against Feyerabend,” in J. Brown et al., eds., An Intimate Relation: Studies in History and Philosophy of Science (Dordrecht: Kluwer), 299-318.
e). “From Theories to Research Traditions,” en Readings in the Philosophy of Science (Prentice-Hall), pp. 368-79.
f). La Ciencia e el Relativismo (Alianza Editorial), pp. 205.
1990
a). “History of Science and the Philosophy of Science,” in M. J. S. Hodge et al., eds., Companion to the History of Modern Science (London: Routledge). 47-59.
b). “Normative Naturalism,” Philosophy of Science, 57:44-59. [A response to a symposium issue of this journal containing 3 papers discussing my work.]
c). Science and Relativism: Dialogues on the Philosophy of Science. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. 173pp.
d). Aim-Less Epistemology?” British Journal for Philosophy of Science, Vol. 21, No. 2, pp. 315-332.
e). “De-Mystifying Underdetermination,” in C. Wade Savage, ed., Scientific Theories. University of Minnesota Press: Minneapolis, 267-97.
f). Science et Relativism (in French). Publisher: Editions Materiologiques pp. 260.
1991
a). (with J. Leplin). “Empirical Equivalence and Underdetermination,” Journal of Philosophy, September, 1-23. [Voted by The Philosopher’s Annual as `among the ten best philosophy papers in 1991′.]
b). Reprint of 1981c in R. Boyd et al., ed., Philosophy of Science (MIT Press). 1991
c). Chinese translation of Progress and Its Problems. transl.: Fang. Shanghai Publishing Company: Shanghai.
d). “Scientific Progress and Content Loss,” in E. Deutsch, ed., Proc. of VI East/West Philosophers’ Congress. University of Hawaii Press: Honolulu, pp561-69.
e). Reprint of 1976c in B. Brody and R. Grandy, eds., Philosophy of Science (Prentice Hall: Princeton).
1992
a). “Why Do Scientists Agree?” en W. Shea & A. Spadafora, eds., Interpreting the World: Science and Society. Science History Publications: Canton, MA., pp. 89-102.
b). 2nd edition of 1988a, con una nueva introducción. Johns Hopkins Press: Baltimore.
c). Spanish translation of 1981c en Olivé & Perez, eds., Realismo (Coyoaçan, Mexico).
d). Reprint of 1991a in The Philosopher’s Annual, vol. xiv.
e). (with A. Donovan & Rachel Laudan)., Scrutinizing Science: Empirical Studies of Scientific Change.
1993
a). Spanish translation of Science and Values, Ediciones Encuentro, Madrid.
b). “Waves, Particles, Independent Tests and the Limits of Inductivism,” in K. Okruhlick & D. Hull, eds., PSA 1992, vol. 2, 28pp.
c). (with Jarrett Leplin) “Determination Undeterred,” Analysis, 53, 8-16.
d). The Book of Risks. John Wiley: New York. 221pp.
1995
a). “APA Presidential Address,” Proceedings and Addresses of the American Philosophical Association, Vol. 69, pp. 27-34.
b). Reprint of 1984c in A. Tauber, ed., Science: The Quest for Reality (London: Macmillan)
c). “Il ruolo della tradizione nella razionalità scientifica,” in A. Vergati and A. Pagnini, Storia della Filosofia: Saggi in Onore de Paolo Rossi (Firenze: Nuova Italia Editrice), 111-28.
1996
a). Beyond Positivism and Relativism (Boulder: Westview Press). 375 pp.
b). “A Confutation of Convergent Realism,” in D. Papineau, ed., The Philosophy of Science (Oxford: Oxford University Press), 107-38.
c). “Progress or Rationality?” in D. Papineau, ed., The Philosophy of Science (Oxford: Oxford University Press), 194-214.
d). “The History of Science and the Philosophy of Science,” in R. C. Olby et al., Companion to the History of Science (London: Routledge), 47-59.
1997
a). “Una Teoría de la Evaluación Comparativa de Teorías Científicas,” in W. Gonzalez, ed., Jornadas en Torno al Pensamiento de L. Laudan (Universidad de la Coruna: Ferrol, Spain).
b). Danger Ahead. John Wiley. 227 pp.
c). “How About Bust?” Philosophy of Science, 64, 306-316.
d). “La Teoría de la Investigación Tomada en Serio,” in A. Velasco, ed., Racionalidad y Cambio Científico (Mexico City: UNAM), pp. 25-41.
e) “Underdetermination,” in The Encyclopaedia of Philosophy. Routledge.
f). Scienza e Relativismo (Italian). Publisher: Armando Editore, Rome. 223 pp.
1998
a). “Naturalismo Normativo y El Progreso de la Filosofía,” in W. Gonzalez, ed., El Pensamiento de L. Laudan (Coruña, Spain: University Press of Coruña), 105-116.
b). “Respuestas a los Críticos,” in A. Velasco, Progreso, Pluralismo y Racionalidad en la Ciencia: Homenaje a Larry Laudan (Mexico City: UNAM), 291-318.
c).” Una Teoría de la Evaluación Comparativa de Teorías Científicas,” in a book edited by W. Gonzalez, ed., El Pensamiento de L. Laudan (Coruña, Spain: University Press of Coruña), 155-170.
d). “Science at the Bar,” in M. Curd & J. Cover, Philosophy of Science: The Central Issues (Norton: New York), 48-53.
e). “Epistemología, Realismo y Evaluación Racional de Teorías,” in A. Velasco, ed., Progreso, Pluralismo y Racionalidad en la Ciencia: Homenaje a Larry Laudan (Mexico City: UNAM), 27-42.
1999
a). “Dissecting the Holist Picture of Scientific Change,” in Perspectives on Philosophy of Science in Nursing, pp. 105-25.
b). Progreso, pluralismo y racionalidad en la ciencia: Homenaje a Larry Laudan
by Ambrosio Velasco Gomez
2000
a). “Is Epistemology Adequate to the Task of Rational Theory Evaluation?” in R. Nola & H. Sankey, eds., After Popper, Kuhn and Feyerabend: Issues in Theories of Scientific Method (Dordrecht: Kluwer). 165-76.
b). “Is It Finally Time to Put “Proof Beyond a Reasonable Doubt” Out to Pasture?” Routledge Companion to Law.
2001
a). “El desarrollo y la resolución de las crisis epistemológicas: Estudios de caso en la ciencia y el derecho durante el siglo XVIII,” Signos Filosóficos, 83-119.
b). “Epistemic crises and justification rules,” in The Philosophy of Al Goldman. Philosophical Topics 29 (2001), 271-318.
2002
a). “A Confutation of Convergent Realism,” in Philosophy of Science: Contemporary Readings (ed. Y. Balashov & A. Rosenberg (Routledge: London), 211-33).
b). (with Jarrett Leplin) “Empirical Equivalence and Underdetermination,” in Philosophy of Science: Contemporary Readings (ed. Y. Balashov & A. Rosenberg (Routledge: London), 362-84.
c). “Positivism and Relativism by Larry Laudan,” Erkenntnis. 47 (3): 415–417.
2003
a). “Is Reasonable Doubt Reasonable?” Legal Theory, vol. 9, 295-331.
(http://ssrn.com/abstract=1152883)
b). “Algunas hipótesis sobre la certeza moral,” Laura Benítez, Z. Monroy, & José Robeles, coord., Filosofía Natural y Filosofía Moral en la Modernidad (UNAM), 263-279.
c). “Should we Be Afraid?” in The Challenge of Terrorism, McDougal Littell (Evanston), 234-40.
2004
a). “El peso racional del pasado científico: forjando el cambio fundamental en una disciplina conservadora,” in Noemí Girbal-Blacha, Tradición y Renovación en las Ciencias Sociales y Humanas, (Buenos Aires: Universidad Nacional de Quilmes), 42-51.
b). “The Epistemic, the Cognitive, and the Social,” in Peter Machamer & Gereon Wolters, Science, Values and Objectivity (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press), 14-22.
c). Science and Relativism (University of Chicago Press).
2005
a). “Prefacio” y “Discurso” in José Hernández Prado, Epistemología y Sentido Común (UAM), 7-8 y 157-59.
b). “Damn the Consequences!” in Richard T. Hull, ed. Presidential Addresses of the American Philosophical Association, 1991–2000. Prometheus Books. Nueva York.
c). “The Presumption of Innocence: Material or Probatory?” Legal Theory, 11(2005), 1-30. ( http://ssrn.com/abstract=1152886)
d). “Privilege in Mexican and American Criminal Law, “in E. Cáceres et al., eds., Problemas Contemporáneos de la Filosofía del Derecho (UNAM, 2005), 403-414.
e). “Por que un estándar de prueba subjetivo y ambiguo no es un estándar?” ÔXA, Cuadernos de Filosofía del Derecho, 28 (2005) ISSN: 0214-8676 pp. 95-114. (http://www.cervantesvirtual.com/FichaObra.html?Ref=029104)
f). “La Historia de la Ciencia y la Filosofía de la Ciencia,” in Sergio Martínez & Godfrey Guillaumin, eds., Historia, Filosofía y Enseñanza de la Ciencia (UNAM), pp. 121-147.
2006
a). ¨Una breve réplica,” Doxa, 28 (2005), 151-55. (http://www.cervantesvirtual.com/FichaObra.html?Ref=029104)
b). Truth, Error and Criminal Law: An Essay in Legal Epistemology. 238 pp. (Cambridge and New York: Cambridge University Press, 2006).
c). “A Critique of Whiggism,” in Laura Benitez, ed., Homenaje a José Robles (México: UNAM,).
d). “Prefacio,” and “Discurso,” in Epistemología y Sentido Común, Segunda Edición Revisada. Editor, José Hernández Prado (Universidad Autónoma Metropolitana), pp. 7-9, 158-160.
2007
a). “Strange Bedfellows: Inference to the Best Explanation and the Criminal Standard of Proof,” Inference to the Best Explanation in Law. Special issue of The International Journal of Evidence and Proof, vol. 11, 292-306, (http://www.vathek.com/ijep/contents.php?vi=11.4.a)
b). “Aliados extraños: la inferencia a la major explicación y el estándar de pryeba penal,” Problema 1: Anuario de Filosofia y Teoria del Derecho (2007), 305-328. (published by UNAM). (http://www.juridicas.unam.mx/publica/rev/indice.htm)
c). La Ciencia y el Relativismo. Spain, Alianza Editorial.
2008
a). Truth, Error and Criminal Law, paperback edition (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008). 238 pp.
b). (con R. Allen) “Deadly Dilemmas I,” Texas Tech Law Review, 41, No. 1 (2008), 65-92. (http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1150931)
c). “The Elementary Epistemic Arithmetic of Criminal Justice,” Episteme: A Journal of Social Epistemology, 5, No. 3 (2008), 282-294. (http://www.eupjournals.com/doi/abs/10.3366/E1742360008000397 )
2009
a). “Re-Thinking the Criminal Standard of Proof: Seeking Consensus about the Utilities of Trial Outcomes,” International Commentary on Evidence (con Harry Saunders), Vol. 7: Iss. 2, Article 1 (http://www.bepress.com/ice/vol7/iss2/art1/).
c), “Sobre una Historia Presentista de (casi) Todo,” in A. Velázquez y L. Toledo, comp., Filosofía Natural y Lenguaje: Homenaje a José Antonio Robles (México City: UNAM), 187-194.
d). “Algunas Situaciones donde el Sujeto tiene un Papel indispensable en la Investigación racional,” in Fernando Broncano y Ana Rosa Pérez, coordinadores, La Ciencia y sus Sujetos, (Siglo xxi Editores, D.F.), 27-33.
e). Meta e metodo. Il dibattito metametodologico a partire dall’opera di Larry Laudan (Italian) by Luca Tambolo (Author)
2010
a). (with Ronald J. Allen) “Deadly Dilemmas II: Bail and Crime,”, vol. 85, pp. 23ff. Chicago-Kent Law Review (http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1150931
b). “Need Verdicts Come in Pairs?” International Journal of Evidence and Proof, vol. 14, 1-24. (http://ssrn.com/abstract=1368988)
c). (edited with Juan Cruz Parcero) Prueba y Estándares de Prueba en el Derecho. la UNAM (Filosóficas). 222pp.
d). “Detectar Errores y Aprender de ellos en un Sistema de Apelaciones Asimétricas,” ibid., 107-122.
e). “Error and Legal Epistemology: the anomaly of affirmative defenses,” Legal epistemology: the anomaly of affirmative defenses,” in Deborah Mayo, ed., Error and Inference, (Cambridge University Press), 376-396.
f). O Progresso e seus Problemas: Rumo a Teoría do Crescimento Científico (Editora UNESP, Sao
g). “Legal Epistemology: The Anomaly of Affirmative Defenses,” in Deborah Mayo & Aris Spanos, eds., Error and Inference: Recent Exchanges on Experimental Reasoning, Reliability, and the Objectivity and Rationality of Science (New York: Cambridge University Press). 376-409. (http://www.cambridge.org/us/catalogue/catalogue.asp?isbn=9780521880084)
Paulo, Brazil), 337 pp. (in Portugese) Also published by the University of California Press.
2011
a). “Thinking about Error in the Law,” in Alvin Goldman & Dennis Whitcomb, eds., Social Epistemology: Essential Readings (Oxford University Press, Oxford), 271-296.
b). “The Social Contract and the Rules of Trial: Re-Thinking Procedural Rules,” Brian Leiter & Les Green, eds., Oxford Studies in the Philosophy of Law vol. I, (Oxford University Press), pp. 195-227. (http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1075403)
c). “Waves, Particles, Independent Tests and the Limits of Inductivism,” in Gregory Morgan, ed., Philosophy of Science Matters, Oxford University Press, Oxford, pp.109-23.
d). “Irv Copi and the Travails of the Academic Life” in Homenaje a Irving Copi (ed., Eduardo Harada), la UNAM, Filosóficas.
e). ”The Rules of Trial, Political Morality and the Costs of Error,” in Leslie Green & Brian Leiter (eds.), Oxford Studies in Philosophy of Law, Oxford University Press, pp. 195-227.
f). (with R.J. Allen) “The Devastating Impact of Prior Crimes Evidence,” Journal of Criminal Law & Criminology, vol. 101, pp. 493-528. (http://ssrn.com/abstract= 1670999)
g). (with R.J. Allen) “Deadly Dilemmas III: Some Kind Words for Preventive Detention,” Journal of Criminal Law & Criminology, vol. 101, pp. 781-802. (http://ssrn.com/abstract=1755215)
h). El Estándar de Prueba y las garantías en el proceso penal. 394 páginas. Buenos Aires: Hammurabi.
i). O Progresso e seus Problemas: Rumo a una Teoría do Crecimiento Científico. Sao Paulo, Brasil: UNESP. 336 pp.
j). “Detecting Error, Learning from Our Mistakes, and the Appellate Asymmetry” (August 5, 2011). U of Texas Law, Public Law Research Paper No. 201.
2012
a). “Eyewitness Identifications: One More Lesson on the Costs of Excluding Relevant Evidence,” Perspectives on Psychological Science, vol. VII (May) pp.272-275.
b). (with Juan Cruz). “Prueba y Estándares de Prueba en el derecho,” Diánoia vol.57 no.69 México Nov. 2012.
c). “Is it Finally Time to Put ‘Proof Beyond a Reasonable Doubt’ Out to Pasture?” The Routledge Companion to Philosophy of Law, Andrei Marmour, ed,, Routledge (London, 2012). pp. 317-332.(http://ssrn.com/abstract=1815321)
d). Science and Relativism: Some Key Controversies in the Philosophy of Science.
e). (with Erik Lillquist). “The Sounds of Silence,” SSRH Electronic Journals, 57 pages.
2013
a). Verdad, Error y Proceso Penal (trans. by Edgar Aguilera & Carmen Vázquez). Marcial Pons: Barcelona, Spain, 332pp.
b). “La Elemental Aritmética Epistémica del Derecho,” in Carmen Vázquez, ed., Estándares de Prueba y Prueba Científica, Marcial Pons Publisher, pp. 119-33.
2014
a). “Science at the Bar,” in M. Del Mar & B. Schafer, eds., Legal Theory and the Natural Sciences, Marcial Pons Madrid(, vol. 6. (Ashgate, London).
b). “Tomarse la ratio de las diferencias en serio: el delincuente reincidente y el estándar de prueba, o el tratamiento diferenciado para los delincuentes reincidentes,” in G. Sucar & Jorge Cerdia Herrán, eds., Derecho y Verdad, vol. IV. (Tirant Press: Mexico City), pp.257-78.
2015
a). Chinese translation of Truth, Error, and Criminal Law: An Essay in Legal Epistemology, translated by Changsheng Li, Peking University Press.
b). “Convergencia o divergencia en la evoluciónde los derechos (penales)?” in Gustavo Ortiz and Juan Cruz, eds., Lenguaje, Mente y Moralidad: Ensayos en Homenaje a Mark Platts, IIF.pp. 187-208.
c). “Why Asymmetric Rules of Procedure Make It Impossible to Calculate a Rationally Warranted Standard of Proof,” (March 24, 2015). Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2584658 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2584658
2016
a). “Por qué las reglas procesales asimétricas hacen imposible calcular un estándar de prueba racionalmente justificado.” In Jordi Ferrer y Carmen Vázquez (eds.),
Debatiendo con Taruffo (Marcial Pons, Madrid), 341-352.
b). The Law’s Flaws: Rethinking Trial and Error? College Publications (Oxford). 203pp.
c). Arabic translation of Progress and Its Problems.
d). (with Rachel Laudan), “The re-emergence of hyphenated history-and-philosophy-of-science and the testing of theories of scientific change,” Studies in History and Philosophy of Science, 59, 74-77.
2017
a). Scientia et Relativisme (transl. in French by Michel DuFour), Edítions Matériologiques, Paris, 219pp. Progresso E Seus Problemas, O (Em Portuguese do Brasil).
b). “The Elementary Epistemic Arithmetic of Criminal Justice,” in R. Covey & B. Veety, eds., Reading Innocence: A Wrongful Convictions Reader (Carolina Academic Press).
c). “Tomarse la ratio de las diferencias en Serio,” in G. Sucar & Jorge Cerdio, eds., Derecho y Verdad IV (UNAM Press, México City), 841-62.
2018
a). “Obalenie realizma konvergentnego,” in Mateusza Kotowskiego, ed., Spor o realizm naukowy (Oficyna Naukowa, Wroclaw, Poland)
b). “Convergence or Divergence in the Evolution of Criminal Rights? A Case Study of the Multiple Incoherencies of the Presumption of Innocence,” in Gustavo Ortiz-Millan, ed., Mind, Language and Morality: Essays in Honor of Mark Platts (London: Routledge), 83-96.